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Abstract 
The ideas of L. S. Vygotsky (e.g., 1934/1987) have been increasingly influential in accounting 
for social-environmental influences on the development of social understanding (SU). In the first 
part of this article, I examine how Vygotskian ideas have to date been recruited to explanations 
of the development of SU. Next, I present a model of SU development which draws on two 
implications of Vygotsky’s ideas: the importance of semiotic mediation for mental functioning, 
and the dialogic nature of the higher mental functions. I then consider the value of the proposed 
model in accounting for evidence from three areas of enquiry: the typical development of SU in 
infancy and early childhood, relations between individual differences in SU and social-
environmental variables, and atypical development. The model is suggested to be particularly 
helpful in understanding the transition from intentional-agent to mental-agent understanding, and 
the role of language in SU. Remaining challenges include a need to specify further the cognitive 
processes underlying internalization, and to gather more extensive evidence on the roles of 
typical and atypical social experience in SU development. 
  
 
Keywords: dialogue, inner speech, mentalizing, private speech, semiotic mediation, social 
understanding, Vygotsky’s theory 
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Getting Vygotskian about Theory of Mind: Mediation, Dialogue, and the Development of Social 
Understanding 
 Human beings attain levels of social understanding (SU) whose sophistication is 
unknown elsewhere in the animal kingdom (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). 
One thing we have learned from more than a quarter-century of theory-of-mind researchi is that 
the cognitive processes underlying these forms of understanding are unlikely to be attributable to 
a unitary social-cognitive capacity (Nelson, 2004). Among the reasons for skepticism about this 
possibility has been the absence so far of any compelling evidence for a modular mentalizing 
capacity based on a unitary neuroanatomical substrate (Apperly, Samson, & Humphreys, 2005), 
despite claims that SU is best understood in these terms (Fodor, 1992; Leslie, 1991). Another 
reason comes from evidence that any genetic component to SU is considerably weaker than the 
social-environmental variables that have been proposed to influence this process (Hughes, 
Jaffee, Happé, Taylor, Caspi, & Moffitt, 2005). Indeed, the compelling evidence for social 
influences on SU development makes it clear that children’s developing understanding of others 
is determined by their ability to draw on pre-existing and parallel-developing social-cognitive 
and general cognitive resources. The time is ripe, therefore, for an account of SU development 
that can pay full attention to how children’s emerging social-cognitive capacities are shaped by 
developments in other areas of cognition.  
 A number of proposals have been made for psychological capacities and qualities that are 
likely to play a part in SU. Simulation theorists (e.g., Gordon, 1992; Harris, 1989) have 
suggested that SU depends upon individuals’ ability to project themselves imaginatively into the 
perspectives of others and simulate their mental processes. This suggests that children’s pre-
existing imaginative capacities are likely to constrain their social-cognitive reasoning abilities. A 
second suggestion, based on evidence for the importance of the narrative context of laboratory 
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assessments of SU (Lewis, Freeman, Hagestadt, & Douglas, 1994), is that children’s abilities in 
this respect will depend upon the capacity to represent and process narratives. A third proposal 
comes from Tomasello et al. (2005), who suggest that SU is predicated upon a species-specific 
motivation to share intentional states with others. These authors argue that experience of social 
interactions in which intentional relations to the world are shared is necessary for individuals to 
build the cognitive structures needed for more sophisticated reasoning about mental states and 
behavior.  
 One developmental achievement that is more likely than any other fundamentally to 
transform children’s SU is the acquisition of language. A rich body of recent empirical research 
has shown how increasingly sophisticated linguistic abilities can mediate and structure children’s 
conceptual understanding of other minds (see chapters in Astington & Baird, 2005a). This 
growth of interest in the involvement of language in SU development is reflected in a more 
general increase in interest in the constitutive role of language in cognition (e.g., Carruthers, 
2002; Clark, 2006).  
 One theory that can be useful for understanding this involvement of language in SU is 
that of L. S. Vygotsky (e.g., 1931/1997, 1934/1987, 1930-1935/1978). The heyday of research 
into children’s understanding of other minds has witnessed a parallel groundswell of interest in 
Vygotsky’s ideas about how human mental functioning is rooted in the interpersonal contexts 
within which it develops, and how cognitive functions traditionally considered separately can 
transform each other in development (see Lloyd & Fernyhough, 1999). In exploring the 
possibility of a Vygotskian account of SU development, I shall be assuming that any such 
account should be able to answer to three main types of evidence. First, it must provide a 
description of normal ontogenesis which can be evaluated with respect to developmental 
observables. Secondly, it must be able to account for qualitative and quantitative differences 
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between individuals in development. Thirdly, it must be sufficient to explain situations where the 
normal course of development is perturbed.  
 This article is in five parts. In the first, I examine how some central Vygotskian ideas 
have been used in explaining SU development. In the second, I outline a theoretical framework 
which places emphasis on two important implications of Vygotsky’s ideas: the role of semiotic 
mediation in mental functioning, and the dialogic nature of the higher mental functions. In the 
third section, I consider how this framework can be applied to explaining typical SU 
development, with a particular focus on the transition from intentional-agent to mental-agent 
understanding, and the role of language in SU. In the fourth part, I examine the model’s 
predictions with regard to those social-environmental and cultural variables known to relate to 
individual differences in SU development. In the final section, I consider the model’s application 
to cases of atypical development, with a particular focus on autism and sensory impairment.  
Vygotsky and Social Understanding 
 Wertsch (1985) identified three main themes to Vygotsky’s theory: (a) the reliance on a 
‘genetic method’, whereby mental functions are investigated with respect to their developmental 
precursors and sequelae; (b) the claim that the higher mental functionsii have their origin in 
interpersonal activity; and (c) the assumption that mental activity is mediated by culturally 
derived sign systems. A foundational concept in Vygotsky’s theory is the notion of 
internalization, the process whereby the individual, through interaction with others, actively 
reconstructs external, shared operations on the internal plane (Vygotsky, 1931/1997). For 
example, Wertsch and Stone (1985) showed how a child collaborating with her mother on a 
problem-solving task will internalize and abbreviate the dialogue which occurred between them 
and use it subsequently to regulate her own solo activity. The process of internalization, along 
with its conceptual relation, the zone of proximal development (see below), has been the subject 
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of extensive research and elaboration (e.g., Lawrence & Valsiner, 1993; van Geert, 1998; 
Wertsch, 1991).  
 A central assumption of Vygotsky’s theory is thus that ‘individual’ mental functioning is 
irreducibly social in origin. Mental activity which is initially distributed or shared between 
individuals is later actively reconstructed on the internal plane. Such a theory has implications 
for the problem of how an epistemic subject can ever come to know about another epistemic 
subject, when the mental states of the other are not objectively observable (Austin, 1979). This 
epistemological problem flows from a Cartesian conception of mind as a mental substance, 
trapped within the body, with no access to external reality except through (possibly unreliable) 
perceptual systems (Ryle, 1949/1973). In contrast, followers of Vygotsky’s approach conceive of 
mind primarily as activity, which can extend beyond the skin to interpenetrate with other minds 
in interpersonal exchanges. Vygotsky’s theory thus offers the prospect of an account of SU 
development which avoids the ‘Cartesian ghost’ (Moore, 1996) by considering how the 
internalization of interpersonal activity fundamentally restructures the individual’s cognition. 
 Vygotsky was not the only developmentalist of his era to argue for the social origins of 
some forms of thought (e.g., Piaget, 1977/1995; Mead, 1934). Where Vygotsky differs from his 
contemporary Piaget, however, is in his claim that higher forms of mental functioning are 
mediated by culturally derived artifacts, such as signs. Vygotsky stated that “the central fact 
about our psychology is the fact of mediation” (1933/1997, p. 138). In a large and diverse body 
of work, he explored the implications of typically developing children’s use of signs for verbal 
planning (Levina, 1981), mediated memory (Leont’ev, 1932), and the self-regulation of behavior 
(Vygotsky, 1934/1997). In a series of hypotheses which have been the focus of renewed 
empirical attention in recent years (e.g., Winsler, Fernyhough, & Montero, in press), Vygotsky 
claimed that the development of verbal mediation is evidenced in children’s use of self-directed 
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language (now commonly known as private speech) to accompany and regulate their behavior. 
Recent research has found support for his predictions of a U-shaped trajectory in private speech 
development (Winsler & Naglieri, 2003), relations with task difficulty and task performance 
(Fernyhough & Fradley, 2005), and the semantic and syntactic abbreviation hypothesized to 
accompany internalization (Winsler, de Leon, Wallace, Carlton, & Willson-Quayle, 2003).  
 Despite Piaget’s (e.g., 1977/1995) acknowledgement of the importance of social 
exchanges for intellectual development, and the interest of neoPiagetian researchers in defining 
the conditions under which interpersonal interaction can lead to intellectual progress (e.g., 
Chapman, 1991), no equivalent to this idea of semiotic mediation exists in Piaget’s work or in 
any contemporary neoPiagetian accounts. Indeed, Piaget’s view of language was somewhat 
impoverished in comparison with modern accounts (Müller & Carpendale, 2000), and probably 
not rich enough to allow for the psychological functions that Vygotsky attributed to it, nor the 
semiotic transformations that he proposed to accompany its internalization. On the grounds that 
Vygotsky’s writings neither address nor repudiate the idea of cognitive egocentrism, Piaget 
(2000) explicitly rejected the Vygotskian view of private speech and, by implication, his claims 
for the semiotic mediation of higher mental processes. Given this essential difference between 
their theories, it would seem important for any Vygotskian account of SU to examine fully the 
implications of this aspect of his theory, and determine how accounts that draw on different 
combinations of these two theorists’ ideas lead to diverging empirical predictions.  
 Vygotsky never addressed the set of theoretical problems that are nowadays gathered 
under the umbrella of theory-of-mind research (see Note 1). Indeed, a lack of clarity in his theory 
about how young children’s thought comes to be ‘socialized’, or capable of accommodating the 
differing perspectives of social partners, lay at the root of his disagreement with Piaget (2000) 
about the developmental significance of private speech (Fernyhough, 1999). Any attempt to 
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draw out the implications of Vygotsky’s theory for SU development must therefore tread a line 
between sensible extrapolations from his writings to new bodies of data, and attributing ideas to 
Vygotsky that were never properly his. That said, Vygotsky’s writings offer a rich source of 
ideas for making sense of social-environmental influences on SU development. His 
acknowledged influence as a theorist makes it important to determine what an account of SU 
development that is true to his theoretical ideas might look like, or, as is more likely, whether 
different neoVygotskian accounts might be possible based on different combinations of his key 
concepts.  
Five Vygotskian Ideas 
 At least five Vygotskian ideas are relevant to explaining the emergence of SU (see also 
Fernyhough, 2004a). Although these ideas represent an integrated theoretical system, and thus 
resist attempts to consider them in isolation, evaluation of existing Vygotskian accounts is likely 
to benefit from clarity on the concepts from which they are founded. My aim in the remainder of 
this section is to itemise these ideas and outline how they have been used in current theorizing 
about SU development, before setting out a specific theoretical position in the sections that 
follow.  
 The first idea that can be useful for accounts of SU development is that of internalization 
(Vygotsky, 1931/1997). A view of SU development as involving the gradual and progressive 
internalization of interpersonal exchanges can help us to make sense of the growing evidence 
that children’s understanding of others is developmentally rooted in their experience of social 
interaction. Vygotsky’s ideas about internalization involve a concept that is richer than that of 
social learning (or the assimilation of information made available in social contexts). Among the 
challenges for contemporary theorizing about SU are firstly to pay attention to the syntactic and 
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semantic abbreviation processes which transform the activity that is internalized, and secondly to 
consider how internalization is itself constrained by existing SU competences.  
 The second concept that can help us to understand SU development is that of the zone of 
proximal development (Vygotsky, 1934/1987, Ch. 6), which describes the difference between 
what children can achieve in isolation and with expert guidance. This notion allows us to 
understand how caregivers have a role in ‘packaging’ alternative perspectives on reality in such 
a way that they can be readily assimilated by the children with whom they are interacting 
(Fernyhough, 1996). For example, appropriate and sensitively-pitched input from caregivers has 
been proposed to ‘scaffold’ (Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976) children’s developing SU (e.g., 
Meins, Fernyhough, Wainwright, Das Gupta, Fradley, & Tuckey, 2002).   
 A third relevant Vygotskian idea is that of naïve participation (Fernyhough, 2004a), in 
which, with adult guidance, children are drawn into practices that they will only later come to 
understand. For example, Bruner (1975) described how infants are initially able to agree with 
adults on a word’s correct use before they understand its meaning. Applying this idea to 
children’s use of mental-state terms, Nelson (1996) notes that children can use such terms before 
they understand the concepts that constitute their referents. Similarly, in their theory of how 
social understanding is constructed within interactions with others, Carpendale and Lewis (2004) 
argue that an “initial, fragile social understanding” (p. 91) can, with the right sort of experience, 
develop into a full conceptual understanding of mind.  
 Fourthly, the role of semiotic systems (such as natural language) in mediating and 
enhancing children’s developing SU can be considered in light of Vygotsky’s (1930-1935/1978) 
ideas of language as a psychological tool that can augment pre-existing cognitive capacities. The 
term mediation has a long history in the behavioral sciences, frequently being used to describe a 
situation where one entity plays an intermediary causal role in the relation between two other 
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entities. In the more limited context of sociocultural theories of development, it can refer to the 
process whereby individuals’ understanding is refracted through the experience of others (e.g., 
Chesnokova, 2004). In its stricter Vygotskian sense, mediation involves the use of culturally-
derived psychological tools, such as utterances in spoken or sign language, in transforming the 
relations between psychological inputs and outputs. As I shall argue later, the use of semiotic 
mediation in representing and reasoning about the mental states of others can crucially offset 
some of the cognitive challenges of these processes.  
 The fifth idea concerns the dialogic nature of higher forms of cognition. Vygotsky did 
not explicitly extend his remarks on the dialogicality of external social speech to the semiotically 
mediated, internalized cognitive processes that derive from it (Cheyne & Tarulli, 1999; Tappan, 
1997; Wertsch, 1980). As such, this idea retains a particular status as a thread that can be drawn 
out of a certain interpretation of Vygotsky’s writings, without representing a view that he 
explicitly endorsed. Perhaps as a result, it is the aspect of his theory that has been considered 
least in relation to SU development. A full examination of this idea and its implications for 
theories of SU is presented in the second part of this article.  
 One further idea that is often mentioned in relation to Vygotsky’s ideas is enculturation 
(e.g., Astington, 1996; Nelson, Plesa Skwerer, Goldman, Henseler, Presler, & Walkenfeld, 2003; 
Raver & Leadbeater, 1993), according to which exposure to cultural norms of explaining 
behavior allows children to “internalize the folk psychology of their particular culture” 
(Astington & Olson, 1995, p. 184). As Astington (2004) has noted, enculturation accounts do not 
necessarily entail that children are passive participants in a process of absorption of cultural 
norms. That said, it is important to remain critical about the interpretation of enculturation as a 
Vygotskian concept. One point to note is that Vygotsky was interested in how specific 
interpersonal relations shape individual cognition, and had little to say about cultural norms and 
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practices per se. Cultural influences, in his analysis, are largely restricted to particular patterns of 
social interaction (which are likely to be influenced by, but are not reducible to, broader cultural 
practices), and to the repercussions of the use of culturally-derived psychological tools (such as 
elements of natural language) in mediating cognition. Furthermore, Vygotsky’s concept of 
internalization entails that patterns of interpersonal activity are fundamentally transformed in the 
process of being reconstructed on the plane of individual cognition. Children’s use of language, 
for example, undergoes syntactic and semantic abbreviation in its transition from social speech 
to inner speech (Vygotsky, 1934/1987). Without such transformations, the appropriation of 
cultural norms of explaining behavior should properly be considered an example of social 
learning rather than internalization.  
Vygotskian Accounts of SU Development 
 Existing accounts of SU development have drawn on different combinations of 
Vygotskian themes. In this section, I review some of the most prominent of these accounts, with 
a particular focus on how they have employed the key ideas itemised above. 
 One of the first authors to make use of Vygotskian ideas in accounting for SU 
development was Nelson (1996). Nelson’s primary focus has been on children’s acquisition of 
conceptual SU through their entry into a ‘Community of Minds’ (Nelson, 2004; 2005; Nelson et 
al., 2003). Her work in this respect draws on a number of Vygotskian concepts, such as 
internalization. Although the mediation of cognition by psychological tools (such as utterances 
in natural language) is also acknowledged to be important for cognitive development in general 
(e.g., Nelson, 1996), the full implications of mediation specifically for SU development are not 
spelled out. For example, in her consideration of the role of children’s own language in the 
construction of SU, Nelson’s (2005) focus is predominantly on the use of terms that directly 
represent mental state concepts. Although she considers how increasing facility with language 
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may more generally augment children’s ability simultaneously to operate with differing 
representations of reality, she offers no detailed account of how such complex representations 
emerge in ontogenesis, nor of how they relate to other key milestones such as the development of 
verbal mediation in non-mentalistic reasoning.  
 Another theoretical contribution to have emerged in recent years is that of Carpendale 
and Lewis (2004). In their integration of Piagetian, Vygotskian, and Wittgensteinian approaches, 
these authors view SU as constructed through children’s experience of reflection on their own 
and others’ activity, in the context both of their experience of objective reality and others’ 
perspectives on that reality. They draw on a concept similar to the zone of proximal development 
to show how triadic engagement with others within the ‘epistemic triangle’ (Chapman, 1991) can 
scaffold children’s acquisition of the correct use of mental state terms and concepts. Although 
they take care to show how such experience can account for the observed gradualism in 
children’s developing understanding of others, they are not clear about the importance of 
concepts such as mediation, dialogue, and internalization (Fernyhough, 2004a). For example, 
they note that “language mediates children’s knowledge of reality” (p. 89), without detailing 
how this mediation might work nor committing themselves to a specifically Vygotskian (or 
otherwise) reading of this term. Theirs remains, therefore, an essentially neoPiagetian account 
which sees no primary role for verbal mediation in SU. 
 In another recent attempt to account for social influences on SU development, Symons 
(2004) draws on Vygotsky’s concept of internalization as a mechanism for children’s acquisition 
of self-other understanding through interpersonal engagement. This account places weight on 
children’s ability to participate in conceptual (and thus to some extent theory-driven) 
conversations about mental states, which is arguably not likely to occur until children have 
already acquired some theory-like (see Note 1) mental state understanding. Symons argues that 
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conversations about mental states allow children to internalize concepts of self and other, which 
can then be used as a basis for reasoning about the relations between mental states and behavior. 
Although Symons’ theory sees a role for the internalization of mental state language, there is no 
reference in his account to the syntactic and semantic transformations that Vygotsky proposed to 
accompany internalization, nor to how internalization is preferable to more orthodox conceptions 
of social learning as an explanation for a child’s mastering the usage of mental state terms and 
concepts. 
 Vygotskian concepts are also employed by Garfield, Peterson, and Perry (2001) in their 
examination of the connections between mentalizing development and language acquisition. 
They suggest that the observed associations between language ability and theory-of-mind 
performance can be explained in terms of language constituting a second necessary condition for 
the acquisition of SU, alongside early triadic engagement with others. Garfield et al.’s use of 
Vygotskian ideas in accounting for these connections remains problematic, however. They offer 
no real detail on how language acquisition might interact developmentally with existing social-
cognitive capacities, nor on what roles internalization and semiotic mediation might have in this 
process. Despite other valuable contributions, their account of SU development is therefore only 
Vygotskian to the extent that it appeals to the principle of naïve participation, or children’s 
ability to engage in social interactions before they fully understand them. 
 A fifth theoretical contribution employing Vygotskian concepts is that of Tomasello et al. 
(2005). Central to this account is the distinction made by Tomasello, Kruger, and Ratner (1993) 
between intentional-agent understanding (which emerges between about 9 and 14 months, and 
underpins infants’ developing ability to comprehend animate, goal-directed, and intentional 
behavior) and mental-agent understanding (which is in place by about age 4, and equates to what 
others [e.g., Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990] have termed a ‘theoretical’ theory of mind). 
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Tomasello et al. argue that the fusing of intentional-agent understanding with a motivation to 
participate in collaborations with others in which intentions, goals, emotions, and perspectives 
are shared (‘shared intentionality’) results in species-unique forms of cultural cognition. Of 
particular interest is their claim that the internalization of interpersonal exchanges paves the way 
for the construction of ‘dialogic cognitive representations’ on which participation in collective 
endeavours is founded. However, they explicitly reject a role for language in this early 
internalization process, and thus, for this part of the developmental story at least, put themselves 
at odds with the view of development espoused by Vygotsky (Fernyhough, 2005).  
 My aim in the remainder of this article is to set out an alternative model of SU 
development which places particular emphasis on two implications of Vygotsky’s ideas: the role 
of semiotic mediation in mental functioning, and the dialogic nature of the higher mental 
functions. In the next section, I set out the main features of the Dialogic Thinking framework for 
understanding the development of the higher mental functions. I then attempt to show how the 
proposed model can fill some of the gaps in existing treatments of the issue, and leads to distinct 
predictions which are suggested as goals for future research.  
The Dialogic Thinking Framework 
 The Dialogic Thinking (DT) framework (Fernyhough, 1996; 2004a; 2004b; 2005; in 
press) draws on Vygotskian and neoVygotskian ideas in exploring the implications of the 
internalization of mediated interpersonal activity for individual cognition. In so doing, it 
highlights an assumption implicit in Vygotsky’s writings but never properly examined by him: 
namely, that the resulting forms of cognition preserve the dialogic nature of the interpersonal 
exchanges from which they derive. As described in more detail below, the internalization of 
dialogue necessarily entails the internalization of the alternative perspectives on reality 
manifested in that dialogue, and the consequent restructuring of cognition to enable the 
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simultaneous accommodationiii of multiple perspectives upon a topic of thought. I argue 
elsewhere that this view of cognitive development can account for the flexible, open-ended 
nature of human thought, as well as making sense of much of the evidence for social-
environmental influences on cognitive development (Fernyhough, 1996; in press). 
 The DT framework is thus an attempt to put some flesh on the venerable idea that 
thinking involves a conversation with oneself (Bibler, 1975/1984; Janet, 1926; 1929; Mead, 
1934; Plato, undated/1953; Rochat, 2001). Introspection tells us that we frequently ‘think in’ 
natural language (Carruthers, 2002; Dennett, 1997; Hurlburt, 1990). Furthermore, the verbal 
thinking upon which we can sometimes introspect often appears to us as a kind of dialogue 
between distinct perspectives on reality (Fields, 2002; Tappan, 1997). The dialogic nature of 
human subjectivity has formed the basis of an important theory of self-organisation (Hermans, 
1996; 2002; Hermans & Kempen, 1993; 1995), and yet the cognitive-psychological implications 
of the dialogicality of human experience remain unexamined (Rochat, 2001). Although there has 
been some attempt to outline the psychological (Fernyhough, 1996) and neurobiological (Lewis, 
2002) preconditions for the emergence of internal dialogue, these approaches have to date 
provided little in the way of testable hypotheses with which psychologists might work.  
 The key to understanding how dialogue can incorporate different, semiotically 
manifested perspectives on reality lies in the work of the Soviet linguist and philosopher, M. M. 
Bakhtin (e.g., 1986). Bakhtin’s ideas about the sociocultural situatedness of utterances in 
everyday language—that is, their ability to betray the position of the speaker with respect to the 
physical and social worlds—have proved particularly fruitful for psychologists working within 
the sociocultural paradigm (e.g., Cheyne & Tarulli, 1999; Hermans, 2002; Hermans & Kempen, 
1995; Tappan, 1997; Wertsch, 1980; 1991). Specifically, an assimilation of the Bakhtinian 
concepts of voice and dialogue can provide a powerful extension of Vygotsky’s theory, capable 
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of speaking to some of the issues of most concern to modern developmental psychologists 
(Fernyhough, 1996; 1997; Fernyhough & Russell, 1997).  
 In Bakhtin’s theory, a voice is a way of speaking that reflects the perspective of the 
speaker. By virtue of the fact that we each occupy a unique position in space and time, every 
speaker has a unique perspective on reality which is reflected in the signs that individual uses to 
communicate with others. As well as betraying the perspective of the speaker, linguistic 
utterances typically reflect the perspectives of those who have used those words before, as well 
as being continually oriented towards a possible response from a real or imaginary interlocutor. 
On this definition, dialogue is the phenomenon whereby differing perspectives on reality, 
manifested in sign systems, come into ongoing and open-ended conflict. It was this ability of 
human discourse to accommodate multiple perspectives that, for Bakhtin, made dialogue the 
fundamental process in human meaning-making.  
 For present purposes, the most important aspect of Bakhtin’s work is his characterization 
of dialogue as involving a simultaneous accommodation of multiple perspectives (Fernyhough, 
1996; Holquist, 1990). The DT framework is founded on one important implication of this 
Bakhtinian idea: namely that, in internalizing dialogic exchanges, the individual does more than 
merely appropriate the utterances of the other. If Bakhtin is correct to claim that an individual’s 
utterances in dialogue are reflective of his or her orientation to reality, then the internalization of 
dialogic exchanges (or, in Vygotsky’s [1931/1997] terms, their reconstruction on the 
intrapsychological plane) will necessarily involve some adoption of the other’s perspective. By 
taking on the utterances of the other through the internalization of dialogue, one is also actively 
reconstructing some aspect of their perspective on physical and social reality. It is therefore 
possible to see certain forms of mental activity as an ongoing dialogic interplay between 
internally reconstructed (internalized), semiotically manifested perspectives on reality 
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(Fernyhough, 1996; 2004a). The problem of understanding other minds thus shifts from the 
question of how an isolated epistemic subject could ever come to know about the non-observable 
mental states of another epistemic subject, towards a consideration of how such mental states 
might be manifested in the concrete semiotic exchanges which are subsequently internalized to 
ground the individual’s mediated thinking.  
 The emphasis on semiotic mediation is critical here. Of fundamental importance for our 
ability to engage in interpersonal dialogues is our use of natural language (typically spoken 
language, but also encompassing sign language) to describe reality for ourselves as agents, or to 
represent our intentional relations to reality. As Bakhtin (1984; 1986) noted, human languages 
are uniquely equipped to represent the speaker’s orientation to, or perspective on, reality. By 
representing these intentional relations for ourselves in a systematically interpretable system of 
signs, we give them a material form which crucially reduces the processing costs involved in 
operating with them (Clark, 1998; 2006). When this process becomes dialogic, individuals have 
the basis for operating flexibly with the multiple perspectives of the people with whom they are 
socially engaged, and thus eventually for understanding how orientations to reality can direct 
human behavior.  
My term for these semiotically manifested intentional relations is perspectives, by which 
I intend to pick out a set of orientations to the world that is specific to a particular physical, 
temporal, and sociocultural location. Given the importance attributed by SU researchers to 
children’s understanding of epistemic states, it is worth considering how this concept of a 
perspective relates to the more familiar concept of belief. A perspective, as defined here, is not 
necessarily a belief, although, as evidence for its veridicality is gathered, it may become one. For 
a proclivity to believe to become an actual commitment to the truth of a proposition, information 
concerning the subject’s own orientation to the world must be evaluated. The process of ‘belief 
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fixation’ (Fodor, 1983) must further involve the commitment to the truth of a proposition that 
characterizes genuine belief (Hamlyn, 1990). My suggestion here is that an individual who has 
acquired the capacity to conduct internalized, semiotically mediated dialogues will be able to 
operate with a range of often contradictory perspectives (used in the broad and inclusive sense 
outlined above) which, depending on the available information and the corresponding levels of 
commitment to their truth, will vary in the extent to which they are held as occurrent or standing 
beliefs. For example, I can participate in a debate about the existence of UFOs and temporarily 
adopt the different perspectives possible on the topic, without necessarily being committed to 
any of them as beliefs.  
 A second point is that the perspectives involved in mental dialogue are not exclusively 
perceptual. My account here owes much to that of Barresi and Moore (1996), who argue for a 
construal of the term intentional relations that incorporates perceptual and epistemic as well as 
conative and affective elements. In addition to a visual perspective on an element of reality, a 
perspective may thus involve an affective orientation to a situation (Hobson, 1995; Vygotsky, 
1934/1987), a situated motivation to act, and so on. What is critical to the establishment of 
dialogue is firstly that these perspectives are semiotically manifested, and secondly that more 
than one such perspective can be represented at the same time.  
 A third point to make about the interplay of perspectives in internal dialogue is that they 
preserve the triadic intentional relations (Barresi & Moore, 1996) of perspectives in external 
dialogue. That is, they bear relations to each other as well as to the element of reality to which 
they are directed (Fernyhough, 2004a). These triadic intentional relations are depicted in Figure 
1 (similar depictions are found in Hobson, 1993, and Tomasello, 1999). Each agent has a 
perspective on (a) the ‘object’, or element of reality being jointly attended to (the thick lines in 
the diagram); and (b) the other agent’s perspective on the object (thin lines). As in external 
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dialogue, the element of reality in question may or may not be physically present. Instead of the 
Aristotelian logical relations of identity/non-identity, the relations that obtain between 
perspectives are the dialogic relations of agreement/disagreement (Hermans & Kempen, 1995). 
In external dialogue, two or more linguistic agents typically share information, collaborate, 
argue, and so on, from distinct perspectives on reality. Even agreement, in dialogue, implies that 
the agents concerned occupy different positions in the world (Hermans, 1996; Hermans & 
Kempen, 1993). This difference in perspective is criterial for our describing an exchange as 
dialogue. As I shall argue below, the origins of internal dialogue in social exchanges with 
sensitive caregivers (particularly early triadic interactions centered around objects) ensures that 
thinkers are constantly open to the differing perspectives on reality offered by their interlocutors. 
Indeed, an implication of the DT framework is that the individual’s cognition is fundamentally 
structured, through experience of social interaction, to expect such alternative perspectives. 
 A final point about the dialogic interplay of perspectives concerns the extent to which it 
follows the temporal patterning of external dialogue. Vygotsky (1934/1987) argued that the 
reconstruction of external dialogue on the internal plane involved important structural and 
semantic changes. For example, the development of inner speech is characterized as a continuous 
process of abbreviation, whereby ‘given’ information is omitted and only ‘new’ information 
included (Wertsch, 1979). Likening inner speech to cases of external dialogue where well-
established shared assumptions between the interlocutors mean that only minimal overt speech is 
needed, Vygotsky argued that the reduction of the “phonetic aspect” of inner speech ensures that 
it is “carried out almost without words” (1934/1987, p. 275). One implication of this extensive 
abbreviation of inner speech is that mental dialogue develops away from the ‘give-and-take’ 
patterning of external dialogue, to a situation where multiple perspectives are represented at the 
same time. It is this simultaneous accommodation of multiple perspectives that makes the 
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concept of internal dialogue particularly useful in accounting for the developmental evidence 
(Fernyhough, 1996; 2004b). 
 To summarize, the DT framework entails construing the higher mental functions as 
involving a simultaneity of multiple perspectives on reality, represented in systematically 
interpretable sign systems such as natural language. These multiple perspectives preserve the 
triadic intentional relations of interpersonal dialogue, and are routinely and flexibly co-ordinated 
in an open-ended and self-regulating manner.  
 Ontogenetically speaking, the DT framework holds that inner dialogue develops through 
the internalization of semiotically mediated exchanges between individuals, following a 
developmental trajectory from social speech, through the intermediary stage of private speech, 
and ultimately to fully covert inner speech (or verbal thought). This process of internalization is 
accompanied by processes of semantic and syntactic abbreviation, one result of which is the 
discarding of the linguistic ‘packaging’ of the perspectives involved, so that utterances in inner 
dialogue become less fully articulated in language. A second result is the abbreviation of the 
give-and-take structure of external dialogue, so that multiple perspectives are manifested 
simultaneously rather than in an alternating, temporally unfolding form (Fernyhough, 1996; 
2004b). Evidence for the syntactic abbreviation of children’s private speech has been provided 
by a number of studies (Feigenbaum, 1992; Wertsch, 1979; Winsler et al., 2003), suggesting 
support for Vygotsky’s account of the development of children’s overt and partially internalized 
speech-for-self.  
 The following example illustrates some of these processes in action. This transcript was 
taken from a three-and-a-half-year-old child solving a jigsaw puzzle (representing a lorry with 
different colored blocks of ‘cargo’) in the presence of her mother (Fernyhough, 1994; C=child, 
M=mother; C’s utterances in bold type).  
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C: (Looks at model, places purple piece at correct location.) That goes there, does it? 
(Sees other purple piece already placed incorrectly.) Ah… (Looks at model.) That 
shouldn’t go there, should it? Who put that there? Not me. (Removes incorrectly 
placed purple piece.) 
C:  (looking at model) Help… where’s the orange bit? (Points to model. Finds orange 
piece.) There. (Places orange piece at correct location.) Goes… in the corner.  
C:  (Points to a gap where a cargo piece should go.) What goes there, then, Mummy? 
(Looks at model.) 
C:  White!     M: You tell me. (simultaneously) 
 
 The dialogic nature of the child’s speech is clearly apparent in this extract. At several 
places the child appears to be asking questions of herself and then answering them. For example, 
in making the utterance “That shouldn’t go there, should it?”, the child adopts an alternative, 
adult perspective on the task and represents it for herself in overt speech while a response can be 
generated. In internalizing this dialogue, the child is consequently internalizing the adult’s 
perspective on this element of the taskiv. In addition, the child’s dialogue with herself is 
abbreviated relative to what would be expected in full external dialogue. From a Vygotskian 
viewpoint, the self-generated dialogue recorded here represents an intermediate step along the 
path of the internalization of external dialogue, during which children’s dialogue with 
themselves becomes both more abbreviated and more covert. This process of abbreviation is 
further evidenced in a transition from expanded to condensed inner dialogue (Fernyhough, 
2004b), in the course of which the external-linguistic origin of the dialogue becomes 
progressively more obscure.  
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 This developmental scheme is represented in Figure 2. As in Figure 1, thick lines 
represent each agent’s perspective on the object, while thin lines represent each agent’s 
perspective on the other’s perspective. At Level 1 (external dialogue), overt dialogue between 
children and caregivers displays the characteristic give-and-take structure of conversation. At 
Level 2 (private speech), children begin to conduct these dialogues in their own overt (and then 
gradually subvocalised) speech-for-self. At this stage, the interlocutor’s contribution (P2 in the 
diagram) is generated by the child (as, for example, in the above transcript, where the child both 
generates the question and answers it herself). At Level 3 (expanded inner dialogue), the give-
and-take structure of external dialogue is manifested internally as a process of talking silently to 
oneself. At Level 4 (condensed inner dialogue), the syntactic and semantic abbreviation of 
external dialogue is complete, and inner speech becomes a dialogic interplay between alternative 
perspectives which bears little structural or acoustic relation to the external dialogue from which 
it was derived. It is at this final stage that verbal thought becomes the act of “thinking in pure 
meanings” described by Vygotsky (1934/1987, p. 280).  
 It is important to note that this scheme is not intended to represent a one-way trajectory 
of development. Rather, it allows for movement between the four levels as processing demands 
change. For example, demanding cognitive conditions may result in a transition from Level 4 
(condensed) inner speech to Level 3 (expanded) inner speech, or even to Level 2 (private) speech 
(Fernyhough, 2004b). This is consistent with the evidence from introspection that we experience 
a more explicit inner dialogue when a task is challenging (representing the Level 4 Æ Level 3 
transition). Under very demanding conditions, we may even speak to ourselves out loud (Level 4 
Æ Level 2), an observation that is also consistent with the evidence that children’s (Behrend et 
al., 1989; Winsler & Diaz, 1995) and adults’ (Duncan & Cheyne, 2001) private speech increases 
under cognitively challenging conditions. There appears to be a cognitive pay-off in reinstating 
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the linguistic packaging of inner dialogue and holding it in phonological memory, or ‘farming it 
out’ to the speech articulation system for overt performance (Clark, 1998; 2006; Dennett, 1997).  
Explaining Typical SU Development 
 I now turn to considering what the DT framework can offer for our understanding of SU 
development. In this section, I suggest that an appreciation of the developing dialogicality of 
children’s thinking can fill two gaps in our current understanding. Firstly, it can help us to 
understand how experience of mediated social exchanges can build upon existing social-
cognitive competences in effecting a transition from intentional-agent to mental-agent 
understanding. Secondly, the DT framework, with its emphasis on semiotic mediation, makes 
possible an interfunctionalv account of SU development which can make sense of the 
overwhelming evidence for a linguistic (or more general mediational) component in SU. 
From Intentional-Agent to Mental-Agent Understanding 
 Any satisfactory account of SU development must be able to show how children’s 
broadening opportunities for social interaction build upon and are constrained by their existing 
social-cognitive capacities. One challenge is to determine which innate or early-developing 
social-cognitive capacities underlie children’s later SU development. Another is to specify which 
kinds of social experience are relevant. Much progress has been made in recent years in 
delineating the social-cognitive skills that infants bring to their earliest social interactions. 
Although there has been considerable debate about the timetable of infants’ developing 
understanding of others, there is an emerging consensus that infants entering the second year of 
life have a conception of the caregiver as an intentional agent: that is, as an actor with 
intentional relations to reality. Tomasello et al. (2005) describe a developmental scheme 
whereby infants progress from an understanding of other people as animate agents (6–9 months), 
through an understanding of the pursuit of goals (9–12 months), to an understanding of how 
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actors are able to choose rationally between different goal-directed action plans (12–14 months). 
Each milestone in social-cognitive competence makes possible a new advance in the 
sophistication of the infant’s social exchanges. At around 6 months, infants can interact directly 
with another animate agent in dyadic interactions that involve sharing behavior and emotions. 
Towards the end of the first year, infants can share triadic goal-directed interactions with a social 
partner. At some time around 14 months, infants can cognitively represent the shared goals and 
action plans of the dyad. This fully-fledged intentional-agent understanding, coupled with the 
species-specific motivation to share intentions with others, forms the basis for children to engage 
in shared intentionality, or “collaborative actions in which participants have a shared goal 
(shared commitment) and coordinated action roles for pursuing that shared goal” (Tomasello et 
al., 2005, p. 680).  
 While both richer (Vaish & Woodward, 2005) and leaner (Moore & Corkum, 1994) 
interpretations of the data on infants’ understanding of intentionality are possible, a full 
evaluation of this debate is beyond the scope of the present article. Rather, my focus will be on 
how intentional-agent understandingvi is converted into richer forms of SU. My arguments will 
draw on Tomasello et al.’s (1993) distinction between three levels at which a thinker can hold a 
conception of a person. In this view, the social-cognitive capacities typically investigated in SU 
research are a relatively late developmental achievement. It is not until around age 4 (the age at 
which children typically begin to succeed on standard false-belief tasks; Wellman, Cross, & 
Watson, 2001) that children treat others as mental agents, or as actors who hold representations 
of reality that may differ from their own. The third level of development is attained around age 6, 
when children come to conceive of others as reflective agents, understanding them as actors 
capable of holding representations of their own representations of reality.   
Vygotsky and social understanding    25 
 
 The contribution that the DT model can make in this respect is in providing a link 
between intentional-agent and mental-agent understanding. Currently Tomasello et al.’s account 
has little to say about the transition between these two levels of social-cognitive competence, not 
least because they regard intentional-agent understanding to be the pre-eminent developmental 
accomplishment from which the most important species-specific forms of cognition flow. There 
are reasons for doubting this claim, however. Firstly, Tomasello et al.’s account appears to 
attribute considerable cognitive sophistication to 14-month-old infants, while leaving open the 
question of what remains for subsequent development to do in building upon these early social-
cognitive achievements (Fernyhough, 2005). Secondly, Tomasello et al. remain uncommitted to 
any possible role for language in the developing capacity to operate with dialogic cognitive 
representations. Thirdly, although Tomasello et al. appeal to a Vygotskian notion of 
internalization in accounting for the construction of these representations, they admit that they 
have no cognitive-developmental account of this process.  
 It is here that the DT model of SU development can be useful. On this account, the 
transition between intentional-agent and mental-agent understanding is not a direct trajectory 
involving the gradual modification of underlying abstract epistemic structures (Nelson, 2005). 
Rather, the link is indirect, and is mediated by language and other semiotic systems. The key to 
understanding the link between these two forms of understanding can be found in the social-
cognitive consequences of the ability to operate with internal dialogues. In internalizing 
dialogue, and thus the semiotically mediated perspectives of their interlocutors, children’s 
thinking becomes permeated by a rich array of different perspectives (Fernyhough, 1996; 
2004a). To put it another way, engaging in an internal dialogue with a virtual other involves 
taking on the perspective of that other. This adoption of the other’s perspective does not, in the 
early stages of internalization, involve any reflective awareness of the multiplicity of 
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perspectives that make up internal dialogue (see Note 4). Just as young children are able, for 
example, to adopt a role in sociodramatic pretence before they have any explicit metacognitive 
understanding of their role-taking (Perner, 1991), so too are children able to adopt the 
perspectives of others through fully or partially internalized dialogue before they attain a 
complete folk-psychological understanding of mind. For example, in the jigsaw puzzle example 
given above, the child is able to adopt perspectives previously held by the adult without 
necessarily showing any metacognitive or metalinguistic awareness that this is happening. 
Rather than seeing internal dialogue as being dependent upon the pre-existence of a fully-fledged 
representational theory-of-mind, the DT model holds that any such folk-psychological 
competence is a relatively late-developing outcome of, inter alia, the internalization of dialogue.  
 The DT model may therefore explain how children are able to operate with other 
perspectives in the absence of any folk-theoretical understanding of how mental states determine 
behavior. Another way of looking at this is to consider the role played by representations of 
mental representations in the DT model, as compared to alternative theories. Theory-theory 
accounts of SU development (e.g., Perner, 1991) typically require that, at some point in the 
developmental process, children acquire the capacity to represent the mental states of others and 
use such representations to predict and explain behavior. As several authors have pointed out 
(e.g., Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; Nelson, 1996), some such accounts make considerable 
cognitive sophistication (the ability to reason with metarepresentations) a prerequisite of 
important developments in SU, as well as paying insufficient attention to the gradual, socially-
embedded nature of SU development. In contrast, the DT model would see representations of 
mental states as relatively late-occurring products of SU development. The only sense in which 
young mind-readers are required to represent the mental states of others is the extent to which 
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dialogic, mediated social exchanges already represent the different perspectives of the 
participating agents. 
 A second point is that external and internal dialogue involves a simultaneous multiplicity 
of different perspectives. Success on many theory-of-mind tasks requires more than simply the 
ability to represent another epistemic subject’s mental representation of a state of affairs; it 
entails the further requirement that this alternative perspective on reality be represented 
alongside the participant’s own perspective. Consider, for example, the unexpected-transfer task 
described by Wimmer and Perner (1983). In the most common version of this task, a child sees a 
protagonist’s desired object moved from one location (say, a blue box) to another (say, a red 
box) in the protagonist’s absence. Success on such a task (i.e., correctly predicting where the 
protagonist will look for his or her object) requires more than a simple overwriting of the child’s 
own perspective (‘the object is in the red box’) with that of the naïve protagonist (‘the object is 
in the blue box’). Rather, it requires that the child be able to hold both the naïve and informed 
perspectives about the state of affairs at the same time (Fernyhough, 1996; 2004a).  
 This need to account for the simultaneous accommodation of different perspectives 
presents a challenge to those theory-theoretical accounts which trace the understanding of 
perspectival difference to specific high-level cognitive capacities. In Perner’s (1991) theory, for 
example, the relatively sophisticated function of metarepresentation is invoked to explain how 
children are able to compare two representations of the world. Other theory-theoretical accounts, 
such as that of Bartsch and Wellman (1995), address evidence that the understanding of 
perspectival difference is evidenced some time before children achieve success on formal tests of 
theory-of-mind reasoning. Bartsch and Wellman’s analysis of children’s use of contrastives 
(Shatz, Wellman, & Silber, 1983) demonstrates that young children can represent perspectival 
difference in their own speech before they would be expected to pass false-belief tasks. 
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Contrastives can be construed as elements of speech which incorporate different possible 
perspectives on reality, such as the difference between an epistemic state and reality, or between 
two individuals’ differing thoughts about the world. For example, Bartsch and Wellman report 
three-year-old Adam’s utterance, “It’s a bus; I thought a taxi.” (p. 206). In subsequent work 
(Wellman & Liu, 2004), meta-analytical data have been combined with findings from a new task 
battery to show that children’s understanding of diverse beliefs precedes their understanding of 
false belief. Such evidence is consistent with the idea that children become able to represent 
perspectival difference (in dialogic private speech and inner dialogue) before they acquire the 
conceptual understanding of mind proposed by theory-theorists to be necessary to represent false 
beliefs. Bartsch and Wellman’s careful analysis of contrastives involving mental-state terms has 
yet to be replicated for utterances that represent perspectival difference without any explicit 
reference to mental states, such as the private speech illustrated in the jigsaw example above. 
Until such research can be conducted, it is worth noting that contrastives were relatively 
uncommon in Bartsch and Wellman’s (1995) database, raising the possibility that they will be 
outnumbered by utterances in which children represent different perspectives without explicit 
reference to mental states. The DT model would hold that such multi-perspectival utterances will 
represent a natural outcome of the internalization of perspectives proposed to result from the 
internalization of dialogue.  
 The DT model thus gains support from evidence that young children use language to 
represent different simultaneously-held perspectives on reality. A similar emphasis on 
simultaneity is present in Gordon and Olson’s (1998) argument that mentalizing performance is 
likely to be limited by children’s ability to update information that they are already holding in 
mind. One way of offsetting the cognitive challenges involved is to assign different 
representations to different social agents (Meins & Fernyhough, 2007). In terms of the DT 
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model, this capacity is underpinned by children’s ability, in inner dialogue, to assign different 
representations to different virtual interlocutors, and thus simultaneously hold multiple 
perspectives in mind. In the case of the behavior-prediction unexpected transfer task mentioned 
above, this might occur through the child’s conducting an abbreviated inner dialogue in which 
the perspectives of both protagonists (‘the object is in the red box’ and ‘the object is in the blue 
box’) are manifested simultaneously. Note that such a situation would not require the child to 
represent the beliefs (here, perspectives) of the protagonists, beyond the extent to which they are 
already represented in the internal, condensed dialogue. When it comes to predicting the 
behavior of the naïve protagonist, the child will have a representation of the relevant perspective 
on the basis of which to compute a predicted response, without any necessary conceptual 
understanding of that perspective as a belief. Children’s justifications of their own responses on 
the task might involve conceptual mental-state language, but this would not be a necessary 
corollary of success on this task.   
 Several implications follow from this view of children’s behavior on the unexpected 
transfer task. Firstly, it remains an open empirical question whether children employ private or 
inner speech while engaged in this task. As far as private speech is concerned, it is worth noting 
that overt private dialogues might be relatively uncommon in such instances, if internalization is 
already established (as Vygotsky’s theory would predict) by this age. Further, there are several 
reasons why classic false-belief tasks might not be ideal contexts for eliciting private speech, 
such as that they do not encourage children to adopt a protracted reasoning process in producing 
an answer (Carpendale, Lewis, Susswein, & Lunn, in press). An alternative might be that 
children conduct private dialogues in condensed or expanded inner speech, the empirical study 
of which can of necessity only be indirect. One possibility would be to employ a dual-task 
paradigm to assess whether interference with children’s phonological processing (for example, 
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through articulatory suppression) compromises their SU task performance. Future studies might 
also investigate the relative contribution of dialogic SU to children’s developing mastery of the 
hierarchy of tasks described by Wellman and Liu (2004). It may be that internal dialogue is 
sufficient for success on those tasks at the lower and middle stages of the hierarchy (such as 
those requiring an understanding of knowledge access and explicit false belief), while additional 
conceptual SU is necessary for those tasks higher up in the hierarchy (such as that requiring an 
integration of information about belief and emotion). A further possibility for future research is 
to investigate manipulations to classic false-belief tasks in which children are directly invited to 
use dialogic reasoning, either through presenting the task materials in the form of a dialogue, or 
by providing a dialogic context within which children can make their responses. If the DT model 
is accurate, such manipulations would be expected to produce success on false-belief tasks at 
earlier ages than would be observed on the tasks’ formally identical classic equivalents.  
 On the present model, success on typical theory-of-mind tasks involves not so much the 
alteration of a body of conceptual knowledge as the development of an ability to accommodate 
multiple perspectives simultaneously in predicting and explaining behavior. Thanks to their 
experience of social situations in which alternative perspectives on reality are readily offered 
(Fernyhough, 1997; see below for further discussion of caregiver input in this respect), children 
already have the ‘open slot’ (the ability to accommodate the alternative perspective of an 
interlocutor) necessary for engaging in internal dialogue before they begin to demonstrate formal 
theory-of-mind competence. One consequence of this is that children will show early SU 
competence in naturalistic contexts, such as has been observed to occur some time before 
children are successful on formal tests of false-belief understanding (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; 
Lewis, 1993; Tomasello et al., 1993). For example, Wellman and Liu (2004) showed that an 
understanding of the diversity of desires precedes an equivalent understanding for beliefs, 
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allowing children to be successful on tasks such as judging that another person will desire an 
object that does not match one’s own desire (see also Wellman, 1990). From the perspective of 
the DT framework, this kind of SU is not dependent upon a formal, folk-psychological theory of 
mind, but rather on the fact that children’s early interpersonal experience ensures that, even in 
toddlerhood, they are open to the alternative perspectives of their social partners.  
 The DT model thus outlines how gradually more sophisticated levels of SU can emerge 
through the interactions made possible by more primitive forms of understanding. Specifically, 
the engagement in interpersonal exchanges necessary for the internalization of dialogue is 
dependent upon the child attaining intentional-agent, though not necessarily mental-agent, 
understanding. Furthermore, the principle of naïve participation is as relevant here as it is in the 
area of language acquisition (Nelson, 2004). That is, infants are able to participate in 
interpersonal dialogic exchanges long before they demonstrate any conceptual understanding of 
other minds (Hobson, 1993; Rochat, 2001; Trevarthen, 1980). This evidence suggests that 
opportunities for the internalization of dialogue, which Vygotsky considered to begin very early 
in development, exist during the prelinguistic gestural dialogues of infancy, and continue 
through early verbal exchanges. This explains how there can be very early, pre-theoretical SU 
which stems directly from the child’s engagement in patterned interpersonal exchanges in which 
alternative perspectives on reality are routinely and readily offered. The specific types of social 
experience which might be relevant here are considered in the next section.  
The Role of Semiotic Mediation 
 The acquisition of language in the second year of life transforms the child’s opportunities 
for social interaction. One consequence of language acquisition is that infants begin to engage in 
linguistic dialogues with caregivers and other social partners, and thus begin the process of 
internalization of these dialogues into overt self-directed (private) and ultimately inner speech 
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(Vygotsky, 1934/1987). As described in the previous section, the DT model holds that the 
emergence of dialogic forms of thought, within which different semiotically manifested 
perspectives can be represented simultaneously, forms the basis of the individual’s ability to 
operate with the perspectives of others.  
The suggestion that language has a critical role to play in SU development is not a new 
one. Astington and Baird (2005b) categorize previous attempts to understand the role of 
language in SU development as involving conversational pragmatics (exposure to the differing 
perspectives of social partners; e.g., Harris, 1999; Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003), lexical 
semantics (learning the correct usage of mental state terms; e.g., Peterson & Siegal, 2000), and 
complementation syntax (acquiring, through language acquisition, a grasp of the syntactic 
structures necessary to use mental-state language to attribute differing perspectives to others; 
e.g., de Villiers & de Villiers, 2000). Each of these theoretical alternatives makes different 
predictions about what kinds of language input will be important, and in which kinds of social 
interaction these forms of input might be expected to be embedded. In this section, I examine the 
predictions made in this respect by some prominent examples of each of these approaches, and 
compare them with those made by the DT model.  
What Astington and Baird (2005b) term the conversational pragmatics approach has been 
pioneered by Harris (1996; 1999; 2005; see also Tomasello, 1999). In Harris’ discourse-based 
model, any interactions which expose children to alternative perspectives on reality will be 
expected to lead to improvement on theory-of-mind tasks. In contrast, syntax-based accounts 
(e.g., de Villiers & de Villiers, 2000) would predict that only language input which enhances 
children’s understanding of complement-taking verbs (such as think) will lead to improvements 
in SU. Harris’s proposals gain support from training studies which have attempted to determine 
the importance of language that presents evidence for perspectival difference. For example, 
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Lohmann and Tomasello’s (2003) findings suggest that exposure to perspective-shifting 
discourse (requiring children to adopt alternative, linguistically-represented perspectives on the 
same element of reality) and sentential complement syntax make independent contributions to 
improvements in theory-of-mind reasoning. Particularly important forms of discourse in this 
respect are disagreements about the truth of a proposition, adults’ misinterpretations of 
children’s utterances, and adults’ clarification requests. These serve to draw children’s attention 
to the fact that adult interlocutors’ perspectives on the world do not necessarily coincide with 
their own. Lohmann, Tomasello, and Meyer (2005) suggest that the form of discourse that is 
most powerful in conveying these lessons is reflective discourse which involves adult and child 
commenting on ideas previously expressed in the exchange. In terms of the DT model, all of 
these forms of perspective-shifting discourse exemplify the simultaneous multiplicity of 
perspectives that defines dialogue. Furthermore, they do not necessarily entail specific reference 
to mental states, meaning that the kinds of discourse contexts that are likely to lead to progress in 
SU development are not limited to those in which the psychological world is the focus of 
attention. 
In his evaluation of this and related studies, Harris (2005) suggests that “discourse that 
emphasizes different points of view with regard to the same event or object is sufficient to lead 
to an improvement in children’s performance on standard theory-of-mind tasks” (p. 76). In 
contrast, he interprets the evidence from training and other studies as meaning that the mastery 
of complement structures is of only limited importance in SU development. For example, in Hale 
and Tager-Flusberg’s (2003) training study, improvements in theory-of-mind performance 
following training with perspective-shifting discourse could not be attributed to increased 
mastery of complement structures. Harris admits, however, that the growing evidence for the 
importance of perspective-shifting discourse is difficult to explain in terms of existing theoretical 
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alternatives. In particular, it is unclear how exposure to different perspectives (without reference 
to mental states) can promote the reorganization of existing conceptual knowledge about the 
mind (as theory-theoretical accounts might expect) or else enhance children’s ability to project 
themselves imaginatively into other people’s subjective states (as simulation theories might 
require).  
 The DT model provides a potential solution to this conundrum. The internalization of 
dialogue leads to a fundamental restructuring of children’s cognition which allows multiple 
perspectives to be represented simultaneously. As the earlier discussion about the relation 
between perspectives and beliefs suggests, these different points of view on reality do not need 
to be couched as epistemic states. For example, consider the following exchange of alternative 
perspectives, in which a child says “It’s raining,” followed by the caregiver’s response, “The sun 
seems to be breaking through.” On Harris’ discourse-based model, this kind of exposure to 
alternative points of view (corresponding to, for example, the Discourse Only training condition 
in Lohmann and Tomasello’s [2003] study) should lead to improvements in theory-of-mind 
performance. Not only is there no explicit reference to epistemic states in this exchange, there is 
also no necessity for each perspective to have, for each respective interlocutor, the status of an 
epistemic state. Since perspectives are not necessarily beliefs (see above), there is no need for 
the interlocutors to be committed to the truth of their propositions. Dialogue represents 
alternative perspectives while giving no direct information about epistemic states, in part 
because, as argued earlier, perspectives do not have to correspond to epistemic states.  
 Lohmann et al. (2005) take a slightly different view of the studies reviewed by Harris 
(2005). They suggest that evidence for the efficacy of perspective-shifting discourse can be 
accommodated alongside findings about the value of training in propositional attitude 
constructions (which merely represent grammaticized versions of the looser discourse structures 
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represented in perspective-shifting discourse). Despite the common ground between Lohmann et 
al.’s discourse-based account and the DT model, important distinctions remain. Crucially, 
Lohmann et al. offer no cognitive-developmental account of how exposure to perspective-
shifting discourse has its developmental effects, nor do they offer any analysis of what 
‘perspective’ means in this respect. They mention Vygotskian internalization as a possible way 
in which children “begin to develop concepts and social-cognitive skills” (p. 249) but take no 
position on the importance of semiotic mediation and other processes in this developmental 
story. Rather, they seem to endorse a theory-theoretical account of SU development, in which 
children, through exposure to perspective-shifting discourse, are able to relate different, 
linguistically-manifested perspectives to their own beliefs about the world. Theirs is therefore 
essentially an individualistic account which sees SU development as involving a growing body 
of knowledge about the social world.  
 Discourse-based models thus draw attention to the question of whether what matters for 
SU development is specifically exposure to perspectives on reality couched in terms of mental 
states, or exposure to any perspective-shifting discourse (not necessarily involving mental-state 
references). A second class of theories, those concerned with lexical semantics, have argued for 
the primacy of exposure to language involving explicit references to mental states. In their 
account of how SU is constructed in the context of interactions within the epistemic triangle, 
Carpendale and Lewis (2004) argue for the importance of communicative exchanges in which 
children learn to talk about the psychological world by reflecting on their own and others’ 
activity. For example, exposure to discourse involving mental-state terms is held to be crucial for 
learning the criteria for correct application of these terms. Although Carpendale and Lewis 
explicitly reject a theory-theoretical account of SU development, their account nevertheless 
entails that it is only talk in which beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on are the focus of attention 
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that should help children in learning to talk about the psychological world. While Carpendale 
and Lewis can account for the evidence for social-environmental influences on SU development 
in terms of the extent to which the child’s relationships are ‘cooperative’ (Piaget, 1932/1965), 
they must still maintain that the relevant exchanges within such relationships be focused on the 
psychological world. In contrast, the DT model and other discourse-based approaches would 
hold that any dialogic exchanges, not only those that are about psychological processes, can 
enhance SU development. What matters is that the child is exposed to different perspectives; it is 
not important that these should involve talk about beliefs, desires, and intentions.  
 Some recent empirical findings are relevant here. Peskin and Astington (2004) obtained 
pre- and post-training measures of theory-of-mind performance for 4-year-olds in two 
conditions, one in which children were read picture books modified to include high frequencies 
of metacognitive language, and one in which the same pictures implicitly required participants to 
think about alternative perspectives, while not being accompanied by any explicit metacognitive 
language. Children in the second group (no metacognitive language exposure) scored more 
highly on a battery of false-belief tasks than those in the first group (who had been exposed to 
metacognitive terms). Peskin and Astington concluded that exposure to explicit metacognitive 
language may be less important in theory-of-mind development than experience of situations 
where one is required actively to construct mentalistic interpretations of behavior. Such an 
interpretation is consistent with the view that it is language (specifically dialogue) that 
represents the content of differing mental states, rather than being about those mental states (in 
any theoretical or metacognitive sense), that is of primary importance in SU development.  
 That is not to say that conversations explicitly focused on mental states can play no role 
in children’s developing SU. Firstly, talk involving mental states, such as the conversations 
involving contrastives described by Bartsch and Wellman (1995), will frequently involve the 
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exchange of alternative perspectives argued to be important for SU. Secondly, to the extent that 
children eventually develop a folk-psychological theory of mind, talk about specific theory-
theoretical concepts such as beliefs and desires will undoubtedly be important in acquiring those 
concepts. Thirdly, the evidence for children’s early use of such terms (e.g., Shatz et al., 1983) 
suggests that such linguistic expressions might have some value in reifying others’ unobservable 
mental states, without necessarily forming part of any theory-theoretical systemvii. 
 All of these potential benefits of exposure to mental state language should be considered 
secondary to the developmental implications of the internalization of dialogue. Other 
implications of the DT model which distinguish it from alternative discourse-based models, 
particularly relating to the importance of semiotic mediation, are considered in the next section. I 
conclude this section by returning to the issue with which it began, namely how to explain the 
transition from intentional-agent to mental-agent understanding. The developmental pathways 
through which this transition is proposed to be effected are represented in Figure 3. Two caveats 
need to be made in relation to this figure: firstly, it is intended to show general developmental 
patterns rather than specific causal pathways, and secondly, it incorporates ideas from a variety 
of theoretical accounts, not all of which share the Vygotskian perspective outlined here. Items in 
the middle column of the figure represent the levels of social-cognitive competence attained at 
different ages, while items in the right-hand column depict the changing interactional 
experiences with which individuals are involved from birth. Thick arrows represent primary 
developmental pathways; thin arrows represent secondary pathways. One purpose of this 
diagram is to illustrate how the development of social-cognitive competence is constrained by 
and in turn constrains the types of social experience individuals can enjoy (Tomasello et al., 
1993). In addition, the diagram demonstrates how caregivers’ ability or willingness to construct 
such interactions can have profound implications for children’s developing SU. 
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 These roles of caregivers and other social partners take two main forms. Throughout 
infancy and the preschool years, caregivers are frequently observed to construct gesturally and 
linguistically mediated dialogues with their children in which the intentional stance is taken 
(Fernyhough, 1996, 2004a; Garfield et al., 2001). Specifically, they have a role in offering 
alternative perspectives on reality in such a way that they can be readily assimilated, such as, for 
example, in their early triadic interactions centred around objects (Hobson, 1993), their verbal 
scaffolding of children’s performance on complex cognitive tasks (Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 
1976), or their pitching of tutoring interventions within the zone of proximal development 
(Meins, 1997). For example, Meins (1997) describes how a mother rated as sensitive in her 
tutoring strategies goes to some lengths to provide alternative perspectives on a collaborative 
box-construction task (particularly suggesting turning over pieces that did not previously fit) that 
are tailored to the child’s current level of functioning. Children’s experience of reciprocal 
exchanges with caregivers in which alternative perspectives are routinely offered, coupled with 
the fact that they have internalized this mediated activity, ensures that individuals’ thought 
remains constantly open to the alternative perspectives provided by a real or virtual interlocutor.  
During the period that follows the emergence of intentional-agent understanding, 
language input from caregivers has an important secondary role in scaffolding the acquisition of 
folk-psychological mental state terms and concepts (Meins et al., 2002; Carpendale & Lewis, 
2004). As discussed in the next section, individual differences in caregivers’ ability or 
willingness to structure children’s social input will be reflected in individual differences in 
children’s attainment of milestones in SU. In this scheme, the construction of a theory-
theoretical understanding of mind is both a relatively late achievement, and one which is 
developmentally dependent upon the child’s internalization of the alternative perspectives 
encountered in early interpersonal exchanges. 
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 An obvious objection here is that the DT model places too much emphasis on natural-
language competence, and would thus exclude prelinguistic typically developing infants, and 
children with sensory impairments (e.g., deafness) and developmental disorders (e.g., 
developmental dysphasia). The DT model avoids this charge by making explicit that any 
systematically interpretable system of signs can form the basis of internalized dialogue. It would 
thus incorporate both sign languages and prelinguistic gestures such as pointing, both of which 
have been shown to be internalized in a Vygotskian fashion (Delgado & Montero, 2005; Goldin-
Meadow, 1999). In the next section, I consider how this model can help to explain individual 
differences in SU relating to different social experiences. In the final section, I consider how 
limitations in the child’s experience of interpersonal dialogue, such as might stem from sensory 
impairment or developmental disorders, will have consequences for the child’s developing SU.  
Explaining Individual Differences in SU Development 
 Since the groundbreaking studies of Dunn and colleagues (e.g., Dunn, Brown, 
Slomkowski, Tesla, & Youngblade, 1991), an impressive body of work has grown up relating 
individual differences in SU to specific social-environmental influences (see Carpendale & 
Lewis, 2006, and Hughes & Leekam, 2004, for reviews). Dunn et al. (1991) found that children’s 
theory-of-mind performance at 40 months was predicted by their exposure, seven months earlier, 
to causal talk about mental states and by mothers’ attempts to control the behavior of siblings. In 
explaining these and related findings, Dunn (1994) argued that certain types of family-based 
social interaction are important for SU development because of the opportunities they provide 
for learning about others’ differing orientations to reality. As Carpendale and Lewis (2006) point 
out, this and other important studies nevertheless fall short of explaining precisely which aspects 
of interaction with siblings and other family members are most valuable in promoting SU 
development.  
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 In this section, I focus on predictions made by the DT model with respect to three 
particular issues. Firstly, I consider what kinds of interaction are likely to have the greatest 
influence on children’s developing SU, and when in development those effects might be most 
likely to occur. Secondly, I examine the DT model’s predictions about how SU development 
relates to the emergence of semiotic mediation in other cognitive domains. Thirdly, I consider 
predictions following from the DT model in relation to issues around culture and enculturation.  
Quality and Timing of Social Input 
 The developmental scheme outlined above makes several predictions about what kinds of 
social experience should relate to children’s developing SU. One factor that may contribute to 
caregivers’ ability to construct effective dialogues with their children is their willingness to 
adopt the intentional stance in interactions with their children, or their mind-mindedness (Meins, 
1997; Meins, Fernyhough, Russell, & Clark-Carter, 1998; Meins et al., 2002; 2003). In a series 
of longitudinal studies, Meins and colleagues have found maternal mind-mindedness 
(operationalized in terms of mothers’ appropriate linguistic references to their infants’ internal 
states) to be a stronger predictor of children’s later theory-of-mind performance than other key 
social-interactional variables such as security of attachment and maternal sensitivity (Meins et 
al., 2002). It still remains to be determined how mind-mindedness relates to the quality of 
dialogues between infant and caregiver, although its proven value in predicting attachment 
security (Lundy, 2003; Meins et al., 2001) suggest that it represents “one facet of a broader 
attunement between mother and infant” (Meins, 2004, p. 116).  
 In the developmental scheme outlined in Figure 3, children’s social partners have a part 
to play at two main stages: the initial construction of triadic interactions and subsequent 
linguistic dialogic exchanges (from birth to around age 2), and the construction of conversations 
about mental states (from age 2 onwards). Mind-minded caregivers will be influential at both 
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stages in presenting alternative perspectives on reality in such a way that they can be readily 
internalized. For example, discourse that involves scaffolding has been shown to encourage the 
internalization of self-regulatory dialogues, evidenced as private speech (Winsler, Diaz, & 
Montero, 1997). Meins et al.’s (1998) findings from a complex box-construction tutoring task 
showed that mothers’ sensitivity in scaffolding their children’s performance (defined as their 
willingness to adjust the specificity of their tutoring interventions in response to child feedback) 
was positively correlated (with a non-significant medium effect size) with their mind-
mindedness in an interview requiring them to describe their children. If these preliminary 
findings are confirmed by future studies, it will additionally be important to determine which 
point of caregiver input is most critical for the child’s developing SU. In their longitudinal study, 
Meins et al. (2003) presented evidence that it was early, rather than later, mind-mindedness that 
was most important in fostering the development of SU. In contrast, those theories that have 
emphasized caregivers’ roles in encouraging conversations specifically about the psychological 
world (e.g., Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; Symons, 2004), as opposed to constructing dialogues in 
general, would seem to entail the prediction that later, rather than earlier, caregiver input would 
be of most importance.  
 In summary, more research is needed to determine: 1) the kinds of social interaction that 
are important for SU development, 2) how these relate to other social-environmental variables 
that have been postulated to play a role, 3) how any influence of caregivers in promoting the 
internalization of dialogue translates into objective indices of internalization such as private 
speech, and 4) at what points in development these influences have their greatest effects. A focus 
on children’s involvement in dialogues with caregivers and other social partners may help to 
direct research in this area, and to remedy the fact that existing relational theories of SU 
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development give few details about the kinds of caregiver intervention that are most likely to 
facilitate SU construction (Meins, 2004).  
SU Development and the Shift to Verbal Mediation 
  The DT model’s linking of SU development to the internalization of dialogue 
distinguishes it from neoPiagetian accounts which postulate no specific role for language or 
other semiotic systems in SU reasoning. For example, Carpendale and Lewis (2004; 2006) claim 
an important role for language in the construction of conversations in which children develop 
“the ability to talk about the psychological world” (2006, p. 239), without aligning themselves to 
a Vygotskian view of mediation (Fernyhough, 2004a). Similarly, Lohmann et al.’s (2005) 
discourse-based account envisages no role for semiotic mediation. On their account, language is 
seen as a source of information about the social world, but it is not suggested that it plays any 
constitutive role in reasoning about social processes. Indeed, such a role for language is 
explicitly rejected in Tomasello et al.’s (2005) related account. Empirically speaking, this leads 
to one important point of divergence between the DT model and the theories of Carpendale and 
Lewis (2004) and Lohmann et al. (2005). Specifically, the DT model would entail that SU is 
developmentally linked with the emergence of semiotic mediation in other cognitive domains. 
For example, it would predict that SU development will proceed in parallel with the emergence 
and subsequent internalization of self-regulatory private speech, which, according to Vygotsky, 
provides a window onto the development of verbal mediation of thought and behavior.  
 In order to understand how the interfunctional (Vygotsky, 1934/1987; see Note 5) 
relations between SU and private speech might unfold over the preschool and early school years, 
it is useful to consider Vygotsky’s claims about the developmental course of verbal self-
regulation. In this analysis, private speech follows a quadratic developmental trajectory through 
early and middle childhood, emerging in the preschool years and subsequently ‘going 
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underground’ (Vygotsky, 1934/1987) to form inner speech (or verbal thought). Evidence for this 
curvilinear relationship has been provided by several studies (e.g., Kohlberg, Yaeger, & 
Hjertholm, 1968; Winsler & Naglieri, 2003). One would therefore predict that correlations 
between private speech and laboratory assessments of SU will differ according to whether 
children are observed during the waxing or waning phases of private speech. Specifically, such 
correlations should be positive during the phase in which private speech is emergent, and should 
then turn negative in the period during which private speech is becoming more covert, as 
children who are further along the road of internalization use less overt self-directed speech.  
  To test this hypothesis, Fernyhough and Meins (in press) investigated whether self-
regulatory private speech and theory-of-mind performance demonstrated changing patterns of 
association with increasing age. In three separate cross-sectional studies conducted with children 
of 49, 56, and 71 months, these authors obtained measures of SU through age-appropriate 
theory-of-mind tasks. Private speech measures were obtained from free-play interactions (49 
months) and from problem-solving episodes focused on an executive task (56 and 71 months). 
Partial correlations, controlling for age and verbal ability, were computed for the relation 
between self-regulatory private speech and theory-of-mind performance. In accordance with 
predictions, the sign of the correlation between private speech and theory-of-mind performance 
changed from positive in the youngest children (r = .51, p < .05), to almost zero (r = -.11, n.s.) in 
the middle age-group, to negative in the oldest group (r = -.48, p < .005). The authors argued that 
this pattern is consistent with the assumption that continued use of overt self-regulatory speech 
in middle childhood reflects a delay in the process of internalization (as, according to Vygotsky, 
such speech has typically been internalized by this point), and would therefore be expected to be 
associated with poorer theory-of-mind performance.  
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 Despite certain methodological limitations (such as their cross-sectional design and the 
heterogeneity of theory-of-mind assessments employed), these authors conclude that self-
regulatory private speech might provide a mechanism for the child to build upon existing SU 
capacities through the internalization of dialogic exchanges with others. They also point out that 
further light may be shed on this relation by investigations of the occurrence of mental state 
language in children’s private speech. Furrow, Moore, Davidge, and Chiasson (1992) 
demonstrated correlations between mothers’ and children’s use of mental state terms in samples 
of parent–child talk. To date, the occurrence of such terms in children’s self-regulatory private 
speech has not been investigated. Two points can be made in assessing this research prospect. 
Firstly, caregivers’ general sensitivity to mind is likely to be reflected in behaviors other than 
mental-state language use (Harris, 2005; Lundy, 2003, Meins et al., 2003). Secondly, the DT 
model would hold that mind-related utterances should be rarer in children’s private speech than 
utterances that reflect perspectival difference without making any explicit reference to mental 
states. This is because, as explained in the previous section, the DT model sees explicit mental-
state discourse as being of less importance for SU development than dialogues presenting 
alternative perspectives on reality without reference to mental states.  
 Despite these complexities and open empirical questions, evidence for a relation between 
PS and ToM is consistent with the view that the preschool and early school years witness an 
across-the-board shift towards verbal mediation in a variety of domains. Generally speaking, 
Vygotsky’s claims about the emergence and subsequent internalization of private speech, 
particularly its relations with social context, task difficulty, and task performance, have been 
well supported (Berk, 1992; Winsler, 2004). Cross-task and cross-context stability in private 
speech production has been demonstrated in recent empirical studies (e.g., Winsler et al., 2003). 
Evidence for a domain-general shift towards verbal mediation has been presented by Al-Namlah, 
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Fernyhough, and Meins (2006), who reported that children’s use of self-regulatory private 
speech accounted for a significant amount of the variance in their use of phonological recoding 
of visually presented material in a short-term memory task. If theory-of-mind performance and 
verbal self-regulation are indeed linked by a domain-general shift towards verbal mediation, it 
might provide an alternative explanation for the observed links between mentalizing 
performance and executive functioning in early childhood (e.g., Carlson & Moses, 2001; see 
Fernyhough, forthcoming, for further discussion). Although there is not yet any direct evidence 
that developmental associations between these variables are mediated by self-regulatory private 
speech, strong associations have been found between children’s use of such speech on an 
executive task and their performance on the same task (Al-Namlah et al., 2006; Fernyhough & 
Fradley, 2005), suggesting that private and inner speech may mediate performance on classic 
measures of executive functioning.  
Culture and Enculturation 
 Given the emphasis in Vygotsky’s writings on situating development within its 
sociocultural context, it would seem important for any application of his ideas to SU 
development to consider children’s exposure to sociocultural practices which may vary across 
cultures. If a conceptual folk-psychological understanding is a relatively late addition to forms of 
SU founded on the internalization of dialogue, one might expect that differences relating to 
culture-specific traditions for explaining behavior (e.g., Lillard, 1998) might also emerge 
relatively late. Instead, any early-emerging cultural differences in SU should relate to differences 
in children’s exposure to dialogic social exchanges. Although a thorough evaluation of the 
model’s power to explain cultural differences in SU development lies beyond the scope of this 
article, one issue that should be addressed is whether the model makes specific predictions for 
situations where children’s social-interactional experiences differ from those pedagogical 
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exchanges, typical to Western cultures, described by Vygotsky. For example, Rogoff, Paradise, 
Arauz, Correa-Chávez, and Angelillo (2003) note that many non-Western and non-industrialized 
cultures privilege a form of learning in which children learn through careful observation of 
others rather than through dialogic interaction. The DT model would predict that, because SU is 
not transmitted through instructional contexts, such differences in socialization practices should 
not translate into cultural differences in SU unless they impact upon children’s broader 
opportunities to engage in interpersonal dialogues. It seems likely that, in many cultures where 
learning occurs through intent participation, children and adults will nevertheless engage 
dialogically in other everyday non-learning contexts. In cultures where non-instructional dialogic 
interaction with adult caregivers were indeed found to be infrequent, any effects on 
internalization might be partly compensated for by interactions with siblings, peers, and 
extended family. On this view, SU development would be seen to be founded on basic human 
interactional processes expected to be relatively invariate across cultures (Carpendale & Lewis, 
2004). Future cross-cultural research might consider the relative contributions of these various 
social experiences to specific milestones in SU development, thus adding to the small body of 
existing research relating cultural differences to Vygotskian internalization (see Al-Namlah et 
al., 2006). 
 Another possible future research avenue concerns the effects of enculturation on non-
human primates, whose SU capacities have been the subject of much empirical interest in recent 
years (e.g., Tomasello et al., 2005). Tomasello et al. (2005) propose that apes show many of the 
component skills that make up intentional-agent understanding (such as an understanding of 
goal-directed behavior), but that their progression to higher levels of SU (such as mental-agent 
understanding) is limited by their failure to engage in shared intentionality. The DT model would 
hold that the transition from intentional-agent to mental-agent understanding involves the further 
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requirement that the collaborative exchanges and dialogic cognitive representations that result 
from shared intentionality be semiotically mediated—otherwise, the internalization of such 
exchanges would have nothing to act upon (Fernyhough, 2005). Currently, Tomasello et al.’s 
claims in this respect are difficult to tease apart empirically from those of the DT model, as 
shared intentionality would seem to be necessary for both the construction of mediated dialogues 
and the kinds of exchanges seen by Tomasello and colleagues as fostering further SU 
development. It is at least plausible, however, that future research with enculturated language-
trained apes might separate out the relative contributions of shared intentionality and language to 
SU development. Although even highly enculturated primates such as the bonobo Kanzi show no 
human-like motivation to share intentions (Tomasello et al., 2005), they nevertheless engage in 
certain familiar social behaviors such as playing with toys (Savage-Rumbaugh, 1990). Future 
research in which the social interaction of enculturated apes is heavily scaffolded (to compensate 
for the lack of an innate motivation to share intentions) might be able to determine whether (as 
Tomasello and colleagues suggest) particular kinds of interaction are sufficient for the transition 
to mental-agent understanding, or whether (as the DT model would hold) such social experiences 
would not be effective without the additional component of mediation by language or other sign 
systems.  
Explaining Atypical SU Development 
 The DT model has clear implications for the study of atypical human populations. In this 
section, I consider SU development in individuals with autism and sensory impairment. Given 
that much of the relevant empirical work has not yet been carried out, parts of the following are 
necessarily speculative, but nevertheless contain several specific proposals for future research.  
SU in Autism 
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 Given that it is only fairly recently that the focus of SU research has turned to explaining 
its development within a social context, it is perhaps not surprising that there have been few 
attempts to explain how atypical social experience can have profound influences on SU 
development. In the most well-known of these accounts, Hobson (e.g., 1993; 2002) has argued 
that SU is developmentally determined by the ability to engage in socio-affectively patterned, 
intersubjective exchanges with other people. According to Hobson, the deficits in SU and 
symbol use observed in children with autism (and in children affected by blindness and deafness) 
stem from such individuals’ lack of opportunity for engaging in interaction within the 
‘relatedness triangle’ (Hobson, 1993), and thus learning about the differing intentional relations 
that others can have to reality. What is currently lacking in Hobson’s account is precise detail on 
the cognitive-developmental mechanisms through which these SU and symbol-use deficits might 
arise.  
 The DT model may help to fill this gap in Hobson’s account. Firstly, it proposes detail on 
the kinds of social interaction through which normal and atypical social experience can have 
their effects. Secondly, it predicts associations between SU deficits and other cognitive deficits 
that are not readily accounted for by the current theoretical alternatives. For example, the DT 
model would predict that individuals whose limited social experiences restrict their opportunities 
for the internalization of dialogue will have difficulties with flexible, open-ended thinking 
(Fernyhough, 1996), difficulties that formed part of the original characterisation of the syndrome 
of autism (Kanner, 1943). In addition, the model would predict that restricted opportunities for 
the internalization of dialogue will result in deficits in self-regulatory private speech and inner 
speech, with all the implications for the development of self-regulation of cognition and 
behavior. While much work remains to be done on verbal mediation in autism and other 
developmental disorders, some existing findings are relevant in this respect. Baltaxe and 
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Simmons (1977) reported that the bedtime soliloquies of individuals with autism lacked the 
dialogic structure usually exhibited by such speech forms. Hurlburt, Happé, and Frith (1994) 
used an experience sampling and interview technique to demonstrate that three high-functioning 
individuals with Asperger syndrome reported far less inner speech than had previously been 
reported by normal adults, a finding supported by first-person accounts of autism which suggest 
a preponderance of visual rather than verbal imagery (e.g., Grandin, 1996). These findings are 
consistent with the view that even verbally fluent individuals with autism are limited in their use 
of verbal dialogues to regulate their own behavior (Fernyhough, 1996; Tomasello et al., 1993). 
More generally, these predicted deficits in verbal self-regulation are in line with 
characterisations of autism which see executive and theory-of-mind dysfunction as going hand in 
hand (e.g., Hughes & Russell, 1993). There is also a growing body of evidence for inner speech 
deficits in autism which, given the assumed importance of inner speech for self-regulation, may 
account for some of the executive deficits associated with the disorder (Joseph, Steele, Meyer, & 
Tager-Flusberg, 2005; Russell, Jarrold, & Hood, 1999; Whitehouse, Maybery, & Durkin, 2006).  
SU in Sensory Impairment 
 Hobson’s account opens up the possibility that varied constraints on social experience 
will lead, via different developmental pathways, to autism-like symptoms. One relevant research 
area in this respect is that relating to congenital deafness. Deafness has been a focus of SU 
research because of the obvious limitations it imposes on social interaction, particularly that 
mediated by language, and because any atypicalities in SU development are not confounded by 
other disabilities. Evidence of developmental delay in theory-of-mind in deaf children born to 
hearing parents (Peterson & Siegal, 1995) has been proposed to bear witness to the importance 
of social input in SU. These effects are said to be mediated by these children’s late acquisition of 
sign language (resulting from their own parents’ relative lack of fluency in sign language), as 
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compared with deaf children of deaf (and hence sign-fluent) parents, who show no such delays in 
SU acquisition (Woolfe, Want, & Siegal, 2002). Such findings are also interpretable within the 
DT framework, which would see native-signing children to be equivalent to hearing children in 
all relevant opportunities for the internalization of dialogue (in this case, those mediated by sign 
language). It should be noted that research into deafness has not yet been able to determine 
which specific kinds of sign-mediated interaction are most important in native signers’ 
acquisition of SU. In line with the foregoing arguments, the DT model would predict that it 
would be signing interactions in which different perspectives are presented, but not necessarily 
framed in mental-state terms, that will be most important (and, by implication, represent the form 
of social input most critically lacking in late-signing children).  
 The DT model would make further predictions not entailed by other theories of SU. Of 
most immediate empirical interest might be the prediction that native signers should show none 
of the atypicalities in the emergence of semiotic mediation that would be expected in late 
signers. That is, their private self-regulatory signing should follow a similar developmental 
trajectory (and show similar relations with task difficulty and task performance) to that observed 
in hearing children. In comparison, late signers should be delayed in the emergence and 
internalization of private signing, and these delays should in turn be related to their SU. 
Examining SU development within the context of children’s overt use of semiotic mediation 
would appear particularly worthwhile in the study of this population, given that research into 
children’s private signing (and other self-directed gestures) is still in its infancy (Goldin-
Meadow, 1999). 
Conclusions 
 My aim has been to set out a model of SU development in which other minds can be 
understood to the extent to which they interpenetrate in social and internalized dialogue. This 
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internalization process builds upon capacities for intentional-agent understanding which allow 
triadic interactions, centered around objects, in which perspectives on reality are shared. The 
emergence of language and the child’s beginning participation in linguistic exchanges herald the 
beginning of a progression from social dialogue, through the intermediate stage of private 
speech, towards fully internalized inner dialogue. The resulting dialogic forms of thought 
provide the basis for children’s capacity to adopt and operate with (in a pre-reflective manner; 
see Note 4) the internalized perspectives of their social partners. In a secondary developmental 
pathway, conversations about mental states with sensitive caregivers present children with 
opportunities to learn the correct usage of mental-state terms and concepts, allowing them 
ultimately to enter into sophisticated folk-psychological ways of explaining and predicting the 
behavior of others.  
 I have suggested that several benefits result from adopting such an approach. Firstly, the 
DT model speaks to our intuition that SU must be at least partly dependent upon social 
experience, particularly that which builds upon pre-existing SU competence. Secondly, it allows 
us to examine the development of SU within a broad, gradualist context of social-cognitive 
development. Thirdly, the DT model proposes detail on the cognitive-developmental 
mechanisms that might lead from particular types of social interaction to enhanced SU, 
specifically those relating to the internalization of mediated dialogue. Finally, the DT approach 
is effective in accounting for the evidence concerning the typical development of SU, findings of 
associations between individual differences in SU and social experience, and atypical 
development. 
 The DT model thus represents a departure from previous theories of SU. In unpacking 
Vygotsky’s suggestions about the importance of semiotic mediation and internal dialogue, the 
DT model adds to the body of theory which sees SU as involving interfunctional (Vygotsky, 
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1934/1987; see Note 5) relations between different domains of cognition. In addition to the 
empirical tests of the model proposed here, much theoretical and conceptual work remains to be 
done. Most importantly, researchers should work to specify in greater detail the mechanisms by 
which external interpersonal exchanges are reconstructed on the plane of individual cognition. 
One problem in this respect is that Vygotsky’s theory requires us to rethink our notions of ‘inner’ 
and ‘outer’ as they apply to human psychology, and to be sensitive to the various ways in which 
mind can ‘extend beyond the skin’ (Geertz, 1973; see also Clark, 1998; Clark & Chalmers, 
1998). In an important development in clarifying this aspect of Vygotsky’s theory, Tomasello et 
al. (1993) have considered internalization as a form of cultural learning, whereby the individual 
gradually comes to take the other’s perspective in thinking. Internalization is thus 
developmentally constrained by children’s emerging concepts of others as intentional, mental, 
and reflective agents. A central assumption of the DT model is that children’s conceptions of the 
minds of others cannot develop entirely independently of their experience of them (Barresi & 
Moore, 1993; Hobson, 1993). At the same time, Tomasello et al. are correct to point out that 
children’s developing pre-theoretical and theoretical conceptions of others are bound to 
influence the kinds of interpersonal exchanges they will be able to enjoy. 
It is here that another objection to the DT model is likely to emerge. I have argued that 
children’s ability to operate with simultaneously-held multiple perspectives in social reasoning is 
dependent upon their internalization of mediated interactions with others. Surely, though, the 
ability to engage in dialogue is itself dependent upon the presence of a certain degree of social-
cognitive sophistication? It is for this reason that SU development has sometimes been seen as 
developmentally primary to the emergence of mediated thinking (e.g., Rochat, 2001). This issue 
boils down to the question of what is the minimal level of interpersonal understanding necessary 
for engagement in dialogue. I have proposed that intentional-agent understanding is sufficient, 
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especially when caregivers (who, if they are mind-minded, will be acting at the mental-agent 
level) are active in pitching their interventions appropriately and adopting the intentional stance 
in constructing dialogues with their charges. Engagement in dialogue, and therefore the 
internalization of dialogue, is accordingly a precursor rather than a consequence of later 
developments in SU. If this is so, it is predominantly due to the sensitive interactional context 
that mind-minded caregivers are hypothesized to provide.  
Another way of thinking about this question is to ask how, if we are to take seriously the 
pragmatic, socially effective qualities of language, the social-cognitive capacities that underpin 
such language use can themselves be dependent on language (Tomasello et al., 2005). The first 
response is that, as noted above, engagement in dialogue with sensitive caregivers can begin 
from the very earliest stages of life. Furthermore, the internalization of such dialogic exchanges 
requires only intentional-agent (not mental-agent) understanding. The second response is that 
children are able to enjoy the semiotic, representational, and hence mediational functions of 
language before they are fully conversant with its social uses. That is, the cognitive benefits of 
representing the alternative perspectives of others in language are apparent well before children 
have the social-cognitive skills necessary for a conceptual understanding of those perspectives.   
I conclude by considering the phylogenetic status of dialogic SU. One plausible reason 
why non-human primates fail to develop human-like SU is because they do not enjoy mediated 
social exchanges with conspecifics. To what extent do the present claims about SU development 
constitute a claim for the species-specificity of these cognitive processes? Tomasello and 
Rakoczy (2003) suggest that the capacity to engage in social interactions underpinned by 
intentional-agent understanding of others is what makes human thought and culture distinct from 
any comparable phenomena elsewhere in the animal kingdom. For these authors, intentional-
agent understanding allows human infants to engage in interpersonal exchanges mediated by 
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conventional sign systems, and thus enter into the flow of knowledge transmission particular to 
their culture. This (probably biologically determined) intentional-agent understanding is 
transformed into mental-agent understanding after, inter alia, several years’ experience of 
perspective-shifting discourse. Like Lohmann et al.’s (2005) account, Tomasello and Rakoczy’s 
view of SU development remains an essentially individualistic account of how children can 
obtain evidence (through linguistic encounters with the perspectives of others) on how their own 
perspectives differ from those of others (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004; Harris, 1996). While 
experience of perspectival conflict is undoubtedly an important part of this process, it is only to 
the extent that these alternative perspectives can be internalized and simultaneously 
accommodated in social reasoning that the child’s formative experiences of sharing perspectives 
with others can continue to play a role in their reasoning about others’ mental states 
(Fernyhough, 2004a). In the model presented here, this accomplishment is made possible by the 
fundamental restructuring of the child’s cognitive architecture that results from the 
internalization of dialogue. In setting out how this developmental milestone is achieved within 
the context of specific sociocultural practices, the DT model allows us to trace some defining 
characteristics of our adult cognitive processes back to the social and cultural milieux within 
which we develop.  
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Notes
 
i The term ‘theory of mind’, with its implications of a theory-like understanding of how mental 
states govern behavior, is frequently replaced by the less theory-laden ‘mentalizing’, ‘mind-
reading’, or ‘social understanding’. In the present article, I follow Carpendale and Lewis (2004; 
2006) in favouring the term ‘social understanding’, because it can encompass the pre-theoretical 
understanding of other minds demonstrated in infancy and the early preschool years, as well as 
more sophisticated later forms of mentalizing. When referring specifically to the folk-
psychological understanding of mental states first evidenced between the ages of around 3 and 5, 
the terms ‘theory of mind’ and ‘mentalizing’ are used. Although a proper consideration of such 
usages is beyond the scope of this article, it is noted that all of these terms may obscure 
important distinctions between forms of mentalistic understanding, such as the difference 
between understanding beliefs and desires. The extent to which the present account requires 
children to have any ‘theoretical’ understanding of mental states is considered later.  
 
ii The higher mental functions (Vygotsky, 1930-1935/1978) are defined in contrast to the 
elementary mental functions, which are unconscious, involuntary, and driven entirely by 
environmental stimulation. By virtue of its being accessible to consciousness, under voluntary 
control, and, as I shall argue, mediated by signs, I assume that reasoning about other minds 
qualifies as an example of a higher mental function. For a discussion of commonalities between 
the elementary mental functions and Fodor’s (1983) modular input systems, see Fernyhough 
(1996). 
 
iii The use of the term ‘accommodation’ in this context is not meant to carry any Piagetian or 
Baldwinian implications. The intention is simply to convey that a multiplicity of perspectives 
can exist simultaneously within, or be accommodated by, an inclusive cognitive structure. The 
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term is generally preferred to ‘representation’, which presupposes some unwarranted (in this 
context) social-cognitive or conceptual understanding.  
 
iv Note that this representation of the other’s perspective does not necessarily involve any 
metacognitive reflection on co-existing perspectives. The process through which the child 
becomes able to reflect on the simultaneity of multiple perspectives that makes up her internal 
dialogue is considered below, when the application of the DT framework to SU development is 
examined. 
 
v Vygotsky characterized his approach as focusing on the problem of “interfunctional 
relationships” (1934/1987, pp. 43-44), by which he meant the changing developmental relations 
between cognitive functions such as thinking and language. The emphasis in his theory on 
semiotic (particularly linguistic) mediation is thus consistent with his interfunctional approach 
(Fernyhough, forthcoming). 
 
vi It might be objected that Tomasello et al.’s account attributes a degree of conceptual 
understanding to infants which overestimates the sophistication of the cognitive structures 
underlying their social behavior. My own use of the term ‘understanding’ is not meant to imply 
any conceptual understanding of how mental states underpin behavior, which, I argue below, is a 
relatively late-occurring developmental achievement.   
 
vii I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.  
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